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Since the Port Hills fire of February 2017, several 
reviews and promises of improvement have been 
generated from local government up to central 
government level. The incident was the final trigger 
for a government-commissioned investigation which 
recommended the biggest overhaul of New Zealand’s 
civil defence arrangements since 2002. Change is 
clearly required, and it has been openly acknowledged 
by some agencies that their response was deficient 
in certain respects. Through documentary analysis of 
reviews, reports, newspaper or media articles and social 
media sources, this article asks: What has changed? 
It questions the rhetoric of lessons learned that has 
accompanied such reviews especially in relation 
to how these two words are defined in the lessons 
management literature. It is argued that no integrated, 
shared-responsibility-focussed review, free from any 
pre-emptive terms of reference, has been conducted to 
date. Rather, government and agencies have exhibited 
a form of elite panic, coined by Chess and others, which 
has been manifested as review panic in this particular 
instance. The article also draws attention to the fact that 
the Port Hills fire was not a natural disaster. At least one 
fire was deliberately lit if not both. It was in effect a $30m 
crime which involved the loss of human life. This reality 
appears to have been overlooked by organisations that 
appear too keen to treat fire events as simply another 
dimension of natural hazards management rather than 
taking a finer-grained risk management approach. An 
alternative approach is signalled, especially in light of 
a central government policy signal released in August 
2018 to introduce fly-in teams during major incidents, 
which could extend into creating a situational awareness 
group made up of local and external expertise. 
Opportunities and initiatives are identified for better 
engagement with local communities such as funding for 
community response plans and paying closer attention 
to community social media outlets.
Keywords: lessons learned; lessons management; 
learning legacy; elite panic; situational awareness; 
social media; enabling communities. 
At the time of publishing this special issue, around 
two years will have elapsed since the 2017 Port Hills 
fire. Depending upon one’s point of view, whether as 
a researcher, policymaker or community member, this 
may be either too late or too early to talk substantively 
about what many refer to as lessons learned. Those that 
live in Canterbury could argue that they still are learning 
some hard lessons from t he earthquakes of nearly a 
decade ago. Yet pressures at public and political levels, 
especially when there appears to have been a run of 
adverse events with similar attributes, tend to compress 
the review horizon; people want quick answers. The 
Port Hills fire has been no exception. There have 
been several reviews already. The most prominent 
among these are a Fire and Emergency New Zealand 
commissioned review of operational firefighting activities 
(Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities 
Council Limited, 2017) and a Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet commissioned review of the civil 
defence response across a number of recent disaster 
events but precipitated by the severity of the 2017 Port 
Hills fire (Technical Advisory Group, 2017). Also, there 
has been at least one explicit lessons learned report to 
date by local government (Christchurch City Council, 
2017a) and two post-fire Recovery Plans  (Christchurch 
City Council, 2017b; Selwyn District Council, 2017). 
The current paper does not question why such reviews 
were conducted. Public interest and political concern 
at high levels, especially in regard to a collective 
sense of déjà vu about yet another disaster has no 
doubt driven efforts to conduct internal and external 
operational reviews. Also, it is important to acknowledge 
that a human life was lost in the Port Hills fire. This 
was not a near-miss event involving only property and 
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possessions. However, it is also important to consider 
the possibility that a plethora of separate reviews 
around one event or across a number of unconnected 
events can actually compound the situation rather than 
resolve it. Also, the appetite for reviews, particularly if 
conducted hastily, may reflect underlying organisational 
insecurities, rather than an openness to change. 
Instead of asking why, this paper attempts to step 
back from a customary interrogation of, for example, 
the interoperability and co-ordination of institutional 
responses. Instead, it questions the use of the term 
lessons learned around this event, particularly in light of 
the literature on lessons management. Both conceptually 
and in terms of overall approach, the current paper aims 
to bring greater focus upon the building blocks of lessons 
management theory (i.e., observations, insights and 
lessons identified) as it applies to the 2017 Port Hills fire. 
The conceptual aim of the current paper is to show or at 
least qualify the currently ill-defined usage of the term 
learned. The main research method used is analysis 
of official reviews and reports, newspaper and on-line 
media articles and social media sources - where the 
latter are often regarded as peripheral to the content of 
lessons from incidents. It should also be noted that, at 
the time of publication, the author had accrued fourteen 
years of service as a volunteer firefighter in urban, rural 
and rural-urban interface settings.
In terms of other key observations or insights, the current 
paper suggests firstly that elite panic, or a tendency 
to make pre-emptive statements and insist on rapid 
investigations, has obscured a larger issue: That this 
was not necessarily a natural hazard event. It appears 
to have been an act of premeditated arson at one, and 
most likely both, of the ignition points. This highlights 
how fire risk reduction is not simply a matter of reducing 
fuel loadings but also of policing criminal behaviour and 
identifying and providing psychological treatment for 
serial arsonists. A second suggestion is for the creation 
of a more independent situational awareness group at 
any incident. This is unlikely to be addressed by the 
current roll-out of the fire service re-structure or by the 
proposed restructuring of the Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management. A third suggestion is 
for more subtle two-way community engagement by 
agencies before, during and after events. The paper 
concludes with suggestions for future priorities for 
wildfire-related research.
Disaster events and elite panic
The Port Hills fire met the conditions of an “extreme 
fire event” (Australasian Fire and Emergency Services 
Authorities Council Limited, 2017, p.43). It was the 
largest vegetation and property fire in recent New 
Zealand history and was instrumental in triggering a 
Technical Advisory Group investigation into how New 
Zealand agencies have handled a number of major 
disasters over the past three years (Technical Advisory 
Group, 2017). From a local perspective, however, the 
fire could be seen as just another shock in an ongoing 
series of shocks, both literal and metaphorical, that 
began in late 2010. The Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010 
and 2011 caused catastrophic harm and produced more 
than 12,000 aftershocks in the three years that followed. 
There were major flooding events in Christchurch in 
August 2012, June 2013 and March 2014. The Shands 
Road fire of January 2014, on the south-western edge 
of the city, destroyed several houses and the Islington 
fire of February 2015, again on the south-western 
edge of the city, also damaged private dwellings. The 
Kaikoura earthquake of November 2016 triggered 
tsunami evacuations in Christchurch and Cyclone Cook 
and Cyclone Debbie, which struck the country in April 
2017 and July 2017 respectively, had major impacts in 
the Canterbury region. The Mayors of Christchurch City 
and Selwyn District declared a local state of emergency 
during the latter event. More recently, Cyclone Gita, 
which caused widespread destruction in New Zealand 
in February 2018, again prompted the declaration of 
local states of emergency in both Christchurch City and 
Selwyn District.
There is no question that New Zealanders expect 
authorities to act on our behalf during a crisis. In New 
Zealand, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) is the most clearly defined 
embodiment of that expectation. New Zealand Police, 
Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ), the New 
Zealand Defence Force and local and regional councils 
also routinely occupy disaster management roles. We 
do not expect these authorities to panic themselves or to 
cause or exacerbate public panic in disasters. However, 
there is a growing body of literature that points to a 
fundamental paradox in many disaster settings: Rather 
than victims, bystanders or the general public, it can be 
the organisations responsible for managing the disaster 
that panic and sometimes cause unnecessary harm or 
hinder recovery. This paradox is articulated in Rebecca 
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Solnit’s (2009) A Paradise Built in Hell where she reviews 
government responses to a number of disaster events 
in different countries. Solnit argues that the hell of a 
disaster event is often compounded by officialdom while, 
when left to themselves, local people almost always 
make the best of a difficult situation.
The term elite panic was coined by Caron Chess and Lee 
Clarke (2008), to describe a multi-layered phenomenon 
where authorities not only fear public panic in an 
anticipatory sense, they often fuel public panic and in 
some cases panic internally. The 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
event in New Orleans has been identified by a number 
of authors as a prime example of this unfortunate 
phenomenon (Solnit, 2009; Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 
2006). Solnit herself went so far as to say that panic 
and interference by powerful elites (i.e. governments) 
in most countries is the norm rather than the exception. 
Other researchers have demonstrated the pronounced 
absence of public panic in disasters and the ways 
in which improvisation and quick thinking by directly 
affected populations make important differences, rather 
than efforts to establish real or hypothetical command 
and control structures (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; 
Quarantelli, 1988; Tierney et al., 2006). The use of 
the word elite is not entirely helpful since it can carry 
connotations of a private response from a wealthy few. 
However, here it is used to describe those in authority 
operating within particular agencies (Solnit, 2009).
In the case of the 2017 Port Hills fire, it is clear that 
the authorities did not panic to the extent seen in New 
Orleans, where state and federal authorities, fuelled by 
hysterical media commentary, manufactured imagery of 
a looting free-for-all or war-zone which overshadowed 
the event itself and hampered some of the rescue 
operations (Tierney et al., 2006). However, in what could 
be interpreted as anticipation of public panic, one senior 
police official was quick to suppress any speculation 
about arson as a cause of the Marley Hill fire - even 
when the Prime Minister commented that this could be 
the case. On the fourth day of the fire, Canterbury District 
Commander Superintendent John Price was quoted as 
saying “Just like any fire, we are working together to 
determine the cause, but it is definitely not suspicious 
at this stage” (Fletcher, 2017, para. 5).
Nine months later, that position had changed - due 
principally to the published findings of the FENZ fire 
investigation team (Still, 2017a, 2017b). The conclusions 
reached by FENZ investigators were independent from 
the NZ Police investigation, which is still ongoing at the 
time of publishing the current special issue. The authors 
of the FENZ investigations believed both fires had been 
deliberately lit. A New Zealand Police representative was 
subsequently quoted as follows: 
“Detective Inspector Greg Murton said a person 
was seen at the Marleys Hill site and the fire was 
considered to have been a criminal act. The cause of 
the Early Valley Road fire was looked at by specialist 
fire investigators and thought to be ‘undetermined’, 
with the various causes considered… That being the 
case, the Police investigation into the Early Valley 
Road fire also remains open.” 
(Van Beynen, 2017a, paras. 6-9). 
Similarly, less than two weeks after the fire started 
and in reply to both property-owner and government 
official frustration at the adequacy and coherence of the 
response, the fire itself was described as exceptionally 
rare. Northcott (2017) reported that this was the first 
time a fire tornado or firenado had been observed. It 
could be argued that such claims helped to deflect 
criticism that the authorities had not performed as well 
as was expected. The mention of a firenado also invites 
comparison with the one scientifically documented 
instance to date of such an occurrence: the Australian 
Capital Territory/Canberra fires of January 2003. These 
fires were attributed to lightning strikes and weather 
conditions, consumed some 160,000 hectares, claimed 
four lives and destroyed around 500 homes (McLeod, 
2003, p. 47). It took researchers nearly a decade to 
prove that what they called a true pyro-tornadogenesis, 
or fire tornado, event had occurred (McRae, Sharples, 
Wilkes, & Walker, 2013)
Even if this eventually proves to be the case - that a true 
fire tornado occurred with the Port Hills fire - the early 
mega-fire claim may have helped to obscure a reality 
that this was not, in contrast to other events referred to 
in the preceding paragraphs, a natural disaster. This 
fire was probably the result of criminal acts of arson, 
one of the most expensive in New Zealand’s history. 
Firefighting costs were estimated at NZD $7,947,317 
(Hayward, 2017, para. 29). Of that sum, the Department 
of Conservation (DoC) (2017) estimated that it cost 
approximately NZD $4.5 million to fight the fire, 
made up of NZD $3.5 million in operational costs and 
$1 million in staff and internal costs -  even though no 
public conservation land was involved in the fire. This 
department’s total firefighting budget for 2016 was NZD 
$8.3 million. The firefighting costs incurred by Selwyn 
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District Council (SDC) almost matched those of DoC, at 
nearly NZD $4 million (Hayward, 2017, para. 2). Prior 
to this event, SDC’s most expensive fire had been NZD 
$250,000 (Hayward, 2017, para. 9). Both agencies 
were covered by insurance but paid excesses of NZD 
$195,000 and NZD $175,000 respectively (Hayward, 
2017, para. 12). Christchurch City Council Civil Defence 
costs were NZD $69,600 and estimated staff costs 
were approximately NZD $500,000 (Hayward, 2017, 
para. 15). 
Private insurance claims amounted to NZD $17.7 million, 
according to the Insurance Council of New Zealand 
(Martin, 2017). It is also important to note that the loss 
of a human life, that of helicopter pilot Steve Askin, 
carried a social cost as well. According to the Ministry of 
Transport (2017), the average social cost or value of a 
life is NZD $4.14 million. At a conservative estimate the 
fire has cost NZD $30 million to date. The environmental 
costs, if factored in, would drive this figure much higher. 
To date there has been little discussion in public about 
the costs of what appears to have been a criminal act, 
not a natural disaster.
Why should this matter? The fire happened, so to speak, 
and it had to be managed and extinguished as if it was 
a natural disaster. The difference is evident when one 
thinks beyond the emergency response dimension 
of the so-called 4 R’s of disaster risk reduction: 
reduction, readiness, response and recovery. As part 
of their background work, the authors of the FENZ fire 
investigation report also considered suspicious fires that 
were lit in the month before the main event and noted 
that there had been at least nine minor events in the 
Hoon Hay and Halswell area including one vegetation 
fire (Still, 2017a). This suggests suspicious activity in 
the area, perhaps involving pyromania and associated 
pathology. 
To date there has been no public messaging about 
what to watch out for in case such an event occurs 
again. Furthermore, a perpetrator appears to be still at 
large and there are going to be very dry and dangerous 
fire seasons on the hills and plains in future. The 2018 
summer fire season was once again classified as dry 
and dangerous with at least one major suspicious rural 
fire at Amberley, not far from Christchurch (Nutbrown, 
Leask, & Dangerfield, 2018). The moment for mob 
panic or vigilante action about the Port Hills fire has 
passed so there is good reason for authorities to give 
more encouragement to people to be vigilant and report 
suspicious behaviour when fire or weather conditions 
are extreme. In Canterbury, this has yet to be addressed 
through public education and information releases. 
Local residents are only being informed that a police 
investigation of the 2017 Port Hills fire remains open.
Formal reviews following disasters 
in New Zealand: Are they learning 
exercises or panicked busy work?
Prior to the 2017 Port Hills fire, other disaster events in 
Christchurch had been the focus of a number of MCDEM 
and other agency and local authority performance 
reviews. This included a Royal Commission of Inquiry 
concerning the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquakes 
(Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, 2012). 
The most comprehensive review was commissioned 
by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(DPMC) and authored by (McLean, Oughton, Ellis, 
Wakelin, & Rubin, 2012). A key recommendation was the 
relocation of MCDEM from the Department of Internal 
Affairs to the DPMC. The Corrective Action Plan (CAP) 
that followed from central government recommended 
not to relocate MCDEM while endorsing a number of 
other recommendations (Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management, 2012). In April 2014, MCDEM 
was nonetheless moved to the DPMC with little public 
discussion. 
More recently, MCDEM conducted its own review of 
responses to the Kaikoura earthquake and tsunami, 
which triggered the declaration of a national state 
of emergency and caused disruptions far beyond 
Kaikoura itself (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, 2017). This review identified four key 
areas for improvement: staff resourcing; warning 
and communications expectations; National Crisis 
Management Centre (NCMC) vulnerability; and NCMC 
design and information management. No specific 
CAP was created but it can be assumed that the 
implementation of the review recommendations has 
been ongoing.
Then there were the reviews precipitated directly by 
the 2017 Port Hills fire. The first and most prominent 
of these was the external review commissioned by 
what was then known as the New Zealand Fire Service 
(Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities 
Council Limited, 2017). This review has resulted in a 
subsequent CAP which has a two-year time horizon 
for implementing the most critical findings (Fire and 
Emergency New Zealand, 2017). The next most widely 
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publicised review of MCDEM’s handling of a series 
of recent disaster events by central government was 
carried out via the DPMC’s appointment of a Technical 
Advisory Group (TAG). The disasters within this TAG’s 
remit were: the August 2016 Hawke’s Bay gastroenteritis 
outbreak; the September 2016 East Cape earthquake 
and tsunami; the November 2016 Kaikoura Earthquake 
and Tsunami, and; the February 2017 Port Hills fire. 
After being commissioned in mid-2017, the TAG 
delivered its findings to government in mid-November 
of that year (Technical Advisory Group, 2017). The 
recommendations in the report are not listed together nor 
are they numbered, making them difficult to comprehend. 
However, the eight action areas or chapters give a good 
sense of the review’s emphasis: national level (functions 
and structure); regional structure; declarations; role 
of iwi; capability and capacity; authority; intelligence, 
and; information and communication. These headings 
are consistent with standard top-down reviews. The 
TAG advocated for very fundamental changes to 
MCDEM, including its restructuring into the National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), and more 
direct intervention by this new agency during local 
or regional events through the use of fly-in teams of 
experts, a recommendation that was previously made 
by the McLean et al. (2012) review. The overall tone of 
the TAG (2017) report is that central government needs 
to be more directive and hands-on in the management of 
large-scale incidents, focussing on lines of responsibility, 
accountability and greater professionalisation of staff. 
The words lessons or learning are absent from the main 
body of the report. 
A change in government at the end of 2017 deferred the 
release of the TAG report until January 2018, at which 
time the new Minister of Civil Defence appeared to play 
down notions of fundamental or radical change, instead 
opting for an emphasis on the recruitment of volunteers 
(Sachdeva, 2017). The Minister later distanced himself 
from these remarks and made it clear he would spend 
time consulting stakeholders around the country before 
making any announcements. After some delay, the 
Government’s (MCDEM, 2018) response to the TAG 
report was released in August 2018. As previously 
mooted, while endorsing many of the recommendations 
in principle, the government appears to have backed 
away from a radical reorganisation of the MCDEM. A 
name change seems highly likely, as is the introduction 
of fly-in teams to support, but not take control of, the local 
arrangements put in place during a major emergency. 
Again, there is no mention of lessons in this response 
although learning appears twice, concerning the training 
of Controllers (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, 2018, p. 27)
As mentioned in the current introduction and partly 
due to changes in the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Act (CDEMA) 2002 (NZ) in 2016, Port Hills 
fire Recovery Plans were launched in 2017 by both the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) and SDC (Christchurch 
City Council, 2017b; SDC, 2017). Recovery planning 
was instigated by the regional CDEM Group and the 
initial terms of reference show that this was to be a 
joint exercise between CCC and SDC, even though 
two functionally independent plans had been created. 
Both plans share similar content. For example, the 
Indicators of Success outlined by CCC are very similar 
to those of SDC and both agencies, although using 
different headings and slightly different wording, identify 
a total of 73 issues and associated actions. There is no 
explanation of how the plans are meant to relate to each 
other and how SDC will learn from CCC and vice-versa 
nor how, precisely, any ongoing agency or community 
learning will be sought or measured. Indeed, the words 
lessons and learnt or learned do not feature a lot in 
either plan. The SDC identifies a single issue around 
community preparedness where the terms are used 
(SDC, 2017, p.23). CCC mentions lessons more often 
in the main body of the plan but only two of its proposed 
actions relate to lessons learned again around education 
and community preparedness (Christchurch City 
Council, 2017b, p.22). Here, lessons learned appears to 
mean information dissemination to the public rather than 
ongoing learning being sought by either organisation. 
As also mentioned in the current introduction, the CCC 
has produced its own Lessons Learnt review. Although 
completed in 2017, it was not publicised until early 
February 2018, a few days before the first anniversary 
of the fire. This was done by way of a publicity release 
only and did not make the news in the conventional 
sense (Christchurch City Council, 2018a). Arguably, this 
was one of the more constructive and direct reflections 
on agency performance during the fire. Of the twenty-
eight separate lessons learnt, the key lessons were 
around better communications with affected residents (6 
lessons), Emergency Operations Centre management (6 
lessons) and others related to early evacuation warnings 
and liaison between agencies. 
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Lessons learned in the context of 
lessons management
The formal reviews discussed above, with one 
exception, appear to pay lip service to the concept 
of lessons learned. None of these reviews make any 
connections with the growing body of work on lessons 
management. A key reference for this emerging area 
of research and practice is the Australian Disaster 
Resilience Handbook 8: Lessons Management, by the 
(Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience (2013). As 
signalled in the Introduction to the current paper, there 
is a need to exercise caution about terminology. The 
authors of the Handbook make the following point: 
Lessons learned embodies two interrelated concepts: 
the identification of the lesson, and the learning or 
change that results. Identifying a lesson does not 
automatically mean it will be learned. In some models, 
the term “lesson”, “lesson identified” and “lesson 
learned” are used interchangeably. 
(Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, 2013, p.6)
The Handbook then provides a useful taxonomy of terms 
that are related to lessons but which in themselves do 
not guarantee learning: observation, insight, lesson 
identified, finding, and recommendation (Australian 
Institute for Disaster Resilience, 2013). Findings, 
recommendations, and action plans characterise the 
reviews discussed above in relation to the Port Hills 
fire with scant mention of lessons and no mention of 
lessons identified. 
Based on my reading of other disaster responses 
and reviews, the Port Hills fire provides a standard 
example of fundamental problems with the way disaster 
event reviews are conducted generally.  Firstly, there 
are multiple reviews with varying terms of reference 
and varying terminologies. Secondly, there is very 
little consideration given to learning from the events 
themselves and how that learning is to be measured, 
instead of merely reacting to those events. Thirdly, 
although review recommendations or agencies’ 
promised response actions are typically couched in 
terms of short-term, medium-term and long-term goals 
or milestones, the timeframes tend to be compressed 
so that the long-term rarely extends beyond ten years. 
Fourthly, and perhaps reflecting the constraints of 
dramatic and highly politicised post-disaster contexts, 
there is little day-to-day focus on lessons being learned 
in the normal course of events.
The authors of the Handbook offer a nuanced framework 
for organisational learning from events, based on 
information collection and analysis, implementation 
of actions and reviewing those actions. This pathway 
is not in itself new. It follows a rational policy design 
approach, but the difference lies firstly in the culture of 
data collection and overall organisational culture which 
avoids investigation, inspection or assessment as terms 
or tools (Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, 
2013). Secondly, and as often shown by a flow chart, 
attached to monitoring and review is an explicit search 
for changed behaviour which, if positive, can then be 
packaged into a lessons learned module for recirculation 
as an observation (Australian Institute for Disaster 
Resilience, 2013). In principle, this approach can apply 
to business as usual, near misses and situations where 
events have gone very successfully. A major question 
is whether the Handbook, in part or in whole, is actually 
used by disaster management agencies. 
In other sectors, there has been a move to create 
learning legacy platforms in order to avoid the risk of 
death by reporting, or excessive time and effort being 
spent on documentation rather than implementation. 
For example, when particular project management or 
construction sector projects are regarded as successful, 
it has become increasingly common to see learning 
legacy sites and resources established in order to more 
efficiently provide lessons for the future. A prominent 
example concerns the London 2012 Summer Olympics. 
The Olympic Development Authority (ODA) (2011b) 
produced a Learning Legacy Report and continues to 
maintain a learning legacy website which is curated by 
Archives UK (Olympic Delivery Authority, 2011a). In 
Christchurch, there is an earthquake-related example 
created by the cross-sector consortium, Stronger 
Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT). The 
SCIRT Learning Legacy site was initiated in mid-2014 
in partnership with the University of Canterbury and is 
maintained principally through the University’s Quake 
Centre (University of Canterbury Quake Centre, n.d.). 
It is of course easier to set up and promote these best 
practice legacy sites when things appear to have gone 
well rather than badly. It would be good to know whether 
they are changing practice in other contexts.    
Getting beyond lessons identified still seems to be a 
major challenge for the emergency management sector. 
A recent article on fire incident inquiries or reviews in 
Australia over the past ten years urges greater use of a 
lessons management agency approach because of the 
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commonality of themes and recommendations (Cole, 
Dovers, Gough & Eburn, 2018). The authors analysed 55 
inquiries and derived 32 themes and recommendations 
where there is some overlap (Cole et al., 2018). 
Ironically, the fact that there are such commonalities 
over a ten-year period suggests that lessons are largely 
not being learned. In other words, a recommendation 
made ten years ago, if learned, should disappear from 
later recommendations rather than recur. 
In addition, the nature of the themes outlined suggests 
that agencies or commissions were preoccupied with 
tightening command and control and disseminating 
learnings in a top-down or interagency sense. Reviews 
of the Port Hills fires did not include recommendations 
for more profound organisational learning and the only 
reference to learning from the bottom up is a relatively 
lowly-placed theme of Incorporate Local Knowledge. 
Furthermore, many of the themes are related to 
mechanistic risk reduction such as Hazard Reduction 
Burns and Pre-Fire Season Preparation. However, 
given that very few fires, even in Australia, do not 
involve human agency (i.e. few are natural events), 
there seems to be no attention to learning more about 
human psychology around fire-starting. Policing is the 
only theme that gets mentioned in relations to arson. 
Therefore, while there may be good grounds for taking 
a more conscious lessons management approach, 
several reviews and the Cole et al. (2018) review of 
reviews suggest that the learning is still assumed to flow 
mainly from the top down or from agency to agency. 
The remainder of the current paper attempts to offer 
some observations that may broaden the scope of how 
to learn from fire events.
Observations on the bigger 
picture: The need for non-partisan 
situational awareness
Even if some of the changes already implemented or 
currently mooted do produce more efficient responses 
in the future, a number of matters seems to have been 
overlooked while reviewing the Port Hills fire. The first 
has to do with preoccupations about jurisdiction and 
the failure to comprehend larger potential threats at 
the outset. The fact that the first fire began only 30 
metres outside the boundary of a large metropolitan 
local authority and less than two kilometres from an 
established suburban residential subdivision (Kennedy’s 
Bush) should have been a trigger for immediately scaling 
up both in terms of firefighting capacity and evacuation 
preparations. Likewise, the second fire appears to have 
been started in a high-use urban recreation zone, not 
on farming or conservation land. 
These issues have not been discussed in detail, nor 
has the larger issue of the expanding rural-urban 
interface. This is where much of the higher risk now 
purportedly resides as traditional farming advocates 
and some researchers connect the recent influx of 
lifestyle plot residents with increased vegetation fires 
- although there is not as yet any empirical evidence 
documented in support of these claims. In any case, 
it is no longer simply a question of rural or urban fires. 
While the restructuring of FENZ to standardise urban 
and rural brigades promises to reduce the uncertainty 
about response and jurisdiction in this third space, there 
has been no evidence to date of other cross-agency 
collaboration for dealing with the risks and hazards in 
the rural-urban interface. This is even though the same 
issue has become a clear preoccupation for Australian 
and North American agencies, for example.
Equally alarming was the unchallenged decision to locate 
the Incident Management Team (IMT) at Rolleston, 20 
kilometres or 30 minutes by road from the incident. Even 
if the fire had been confined to Selwyn District, it made 
sense to use a base of operations that was closer at 
hand, whether within SDC or CCC boundaries. There 
were plenty of options available. Unlike the logic used 
for designating a National Crisis Management Centre 
at a single bunker, or secure underground location (a 
policy which is likely to change as a result of the Kaikoura 
Earthquake in November 2016 and the MCDEM 2016 
TAG 2017 reviews), there was no technical or logistical 
reason why an IMT could not have been set up closer to 
the event. Other than fear of disturbance from the public, 
it is hard to see why this standard operating procedure 
was not overridden in the circumstances, particularly 
since the biggest threat was not to rural populations 
but to residents of New Zealand’s second largest city. 
Similarly, having two separate emergency operation 
centres (EOC’s), one for each local authority (at 
Rolleston and Christchurch City Council Civic Offices), 
was unfortunate. Again, a combined EOC chould have 
been located closer to the incident, with a much closer 
connections to welfare centres, evacuees and public 
information outlets. The same is true for any Incident 
Control Point (ICP) and their connections to EOC’s and 
the IMT. During response to the 2017 Port Hills fire, they 
needed to be physically closer to one another.
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Similarly, the choice of welfare centres and information 
centres seemed arbitrary or unnecessarily territorial. The 
most sensibly-located welfare centre was established 
at Te Hapua Halswell Aquatic Centre, Library and 
Community Facility. This was a CCC-owned asset, some 
7.3 kilometres or 10 minutes from the incident by motor 
vehicle. The other welfare centres were at the Selwyn 
Events Centre in Lincoln, owned by SDC, some 11 
kilometres from the incident, with no obvious connection 
to local evacuees, most of whom were Christchurch 
City residents. The third centre was established at 
Nga Hau E Wha National Marae in the east of the city, 
some 20 kilometres and 30 minutes away from the 
incident. In retrospect, it would have made more sense 
to locate the IMT, EOC’s, welfare centres and other 
information hubs regarding cordons and evacuations 
at large facilities nearer to the incident. Christchurch 
City Council’s Pioneer Stadium, for example, would 
have been closer and more familiar to many displaced 
or concerned residents. 
By contrast, and as a positive lesson in terms of choosing 
a good localised centre of operations and information, 
the Governors Bay community was relatively well-
served by the authorities. The settlement came close to 
losing houses during the event and evacuations were 
carried out as a precautionary measure. Fortunately, fire 
behaviour and the actions of helicopter crews meant that 
no properties were lost although substantial damage was 
done to private conservation land. The venue chosen for 
public meetings and information sharing was the local 
volunteer fire station. The fire station was in the middle 
of the community and provided a good monitoring and 
surveillance site for the fire. The public meeting there on 
the 15th of February, with officials from many agencies, 
was judged a success and features prominently in a 
commemorative publication produced by Governors Bay 
Volunteer Brigade members (Brown & Fogarty, 2017). 
A similar experience occurred in Lyttelton during the 
earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The fire station was a 
beacon in the local community and this was recorded in 
a commemorative book by Suren (2012). In Christchurch 
City or any large New Zealand city, the opportunity to 
use fire stations as community hubs is limited since 
almost all are paid staff stations in more or less arbitrary 
locations and they hardly count as community assets. 
The point here, however, is that authorities chould look 
more closely at nearby trusted and familiar facilities for 
some of their incident management activities. Ideally, this 
scoping would be carried out by a situational awareness 
team, comprised of fly-in experts and community 
members with expert local knowledge. This scoping 
could be carried out from the moment authorities have 
been notified of an incident which has the potential to 
escalate. Some might argue that those who live in the 
rural-urban interface, often referred to pejoratively as 
life-stylers or hobby farmers are less community-minded 
than traditional urban or rural dwellers, making them 
harder to engage with and making it harder to identify 
appropriate sites for evacuation centre, welfare centres 
or information hubs. However, this is belied by how local 
residents often react to emergencies. In the case of the 
Port Hills fire, there was at least one instance where 
apparently well informed, fire smart, valley-dwellers felt 
that their preparedness to stay and defend properties 
as a fire party was rebuffed by authorities (Cooke & 
Redmond, 2017). 
Enabling communities
The above point raises an issue concerning how 
local authorities and FENZ are doing to engage with 
communities in order to reduce the risk of future fires in 
the rural-urban interface. The Recovery Plans for Selwyn 
and Christchurch talk in detail about working directly 
alongside affected residents to help them rebuild and 
restore their properties, to make them less vulnerable 
to future fires. Some of those directly affected were still 
unhappy with the flow of information and explanations a 
year after the event (Wright, 2018). Furthermore, there 
is little sign of community engagement in the burnt-over 
valleys with those who did not lose property but were 
still affected by the fire. The FENZ website makes no 
obvious reference to the fire nor does it seem to have 
given any extra attention to the rural-urban interface and 
these growing communities. Instead, all information still 
appears to be generically aimed at individual property 
owners (Fire and Emergency New Zealand, n.d.).
Perhaps the greatest sign of encouragement is a little-
publicised initiative from the Christchurch CDEM team 
working at the CCC. In March 2018 they launched the 
Neighbourhood Action Fund, which allows community 
groups to bid for up to NZD $5,000 to prepare community 
response plans (Christchurch City Council, 2018b). 
Although not targeted specifically at the Port Hills 
communities, they currently provide an opportunity for 
community response planning. The CCC also provides 
guidance and encouragement through their Community 
Resilience Planning Programme (Christchurch City 
Council, n.d.). There is also a recent example of three 
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Port Hills neighbourhoods with common interests, 
characteristics and exposure to natural hazards 
(Sumner, Redcliffs and Mt Pleasant) combining forces to 
produce a community booklet which covers community 
responses to disasters (Arnold, 2018).  Twenty-two of 
the 38 pages in the booklet are concerned with what to 
do a variety of emergencies, including vegetation fires, 
and evacuation zones for tsunamis. 
While agencies may still struggle to make their own 
social media outlets focal places for disaster response 
or preparedness information, there are indications 
that emergency planning or warnings are being taken 
seriously on a number of community-based social media 
sites. Interestingly, in the case of Christchurch, the best 
examples appear to be in Sumner and Governors Bay, 
two communities where volunteer fire brigades are very 
active. There are frequent cross-overs of emergency 
warnings or updates between the Facebook pages 
of the local brigade and the community residents’ 
association, especially during a major incident. In 
Sumner the Sumner Hub page (Sumner Community 
Residents’ Association, n.d.) often connects with the 
Sumner Volunteer Fire Brigade page (Sumner Volunteer 
Fire Brigade, n.d.). In the case of Governors Bay, a 
“Governors Bay Community” page overlaps at times with 
that of the local brigade (Governors Bay Community, 
n.d.; Governors Bay Volunteer Fire Brigade, n.d.). 
People often turn to these sources and the wider news 
media in local emergencies, rather than official websites 
and social media sites. Agencies nonetheless appear 
to still operate under often outdated and inflexible 
command and control structures.
Conclusion
The 2017 Port Hills fire, as is commonly the case with 
major disaster events that involve the loss of life or 
property, has generated multiple reviews and promises 
of better performance in the future. In certain respects, 
these local lessons seem like useful learnings for 
emergency managers in general and would resonate 
with members of the public, not just affected residents. 
However, it is not clear how far these findings will reach 
and how they will link to larger reforms promised by the 
Minister of Civil Defence. This points to a larger potential 
problem: Reviews for review’s sake or to satisfy political 
expectations. It is possible that all these reviews actually 
get in the way of an integrated and more synoptic review 
of how to achieve better responses. This would require 
time, resources and a collaborative approach, with a 
less restrictive brief than is often issued at ministerial 
or departmental level. 
At the time of writing, we are left with promises of more 
central government reform and a reassurance that 
the reorganisation of the New Zealand Fire Service 
as FENZ, which began with a review first initiated in 
2012 but which was only passed into law in July 2017, 
will eliminate many of the problems experienced with 
the 2017 Port Hills firefighting operation (Van Beynen, 
2017b). 
It still seems, however, that these promises and other 
review implications fall far short of lessons learned 
or lessons management, in a comprehensive sense. 
The emphasis is still on managing public perceptions 
rather than acting as learning organisations. It remains 
to be seen whether the redesignation of the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management to 
either the Ministry of Emergency Management or the 
National Emergency Management Agency is anything 
but a symbolic gesture. Some lessons appear to have 
been learned at the local level. Mayors appear more 
comfortable with declaring local states of emergency in 
an anticipatory manner rather than waiting for events 
to escalate. Local authorities are trying to support local 
communities in response planning. Local communities 
are networking to share common experiences and risks. 
However, at a number of levels, issues concerning the 
2017 Port Hills fire remain unresolved. 
The probable arsonist or arsonists are still at large. The 
event has yet to be acknowledged and fully registered 
as the Port Hills Arson rather than just a severe wildfire 
event. Although tsunami and flooding evacuation zones 
have been mapped and promulgated for Christchurch 
and the bays of Banks Peninsula, we have yet to see 
progress on wildfire evacuation zones. This is even 
though vegetation fires have become an annual risk. 
Ideally, the fly-in support teams promised in August 2018 
by central government would take the form of situational 
awareness and outside-the-box advice during and after 
the events. For now, we have yet to see evidence of a 
more integrated, joined-up and bottom-up approach to 
learning from the Port Hills fire. 
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